ADDER View Secure Benutzerhandbuch - Seite 15
Blättern Sie online oder laden Sie pdf Benutzerhandbuch für Schalter ADDER View Secure herunter. ADDER View Secure 20 Seiten. Adderview secure
Seite druckenFurther information
Troubleshooting
If you experience problems when installing or using the AdderView Secure unit,
please check through this section for a possible solution. If your problem is not
listed here and you cannot resolve the issue, then please refer to the 'Getting
assistance' section.
No video from computer
• This is most likely to be associated with a mismatch between the host
computer's video output and the DDC data held within the AdderView
Secure. Computers often need read the correct DDC data before they will
output a video signal. If digital DDC data is presented to a computer's
analog video port, a video signal will not be generated. Conversely, if analog
DDC data is presented to a computer's digital video port, a video signal will
also not be generated.
Depending on your DDC connection policy (see
information
for details), remember that the AdderView Secure will only
attempt to read the DDC data from your monitor when the AdderView
Secure is first powered on. To ensure that your monitor's DDC data is read
and stored correctly, ensure that it is attached and powered on when you
switch on the AdderView Secure.
Video from some computers only
• Remember that the AdderView Secure does not convert digital video
signals to analog signals and vice versa so it is not generally possible to
mix digital and analog inputs. Mixed systems are possible in certain special
circumstances but these will require specialist assistance from Adder
technical support.
Summary of threats and solutions
Video.display.(DDC).
This section provides a list of potential security threats that the AdderView
Secure might face during operation and the special steps that have been taken
to counteract them.
Threat
Microprocessor
malfunction or
unanticipated software
bugs causing data to flow
between ports.
Subversive snooping
by means of detecting
electromagnetic radiation
emitted from the
equipment.
Detection of signals
on one computer by
monitoring for crosstalk
(leakage) signals on
another computer.
Malicious modification of
microprocessor software
causing data to leak
between ports.
Buffered data within a
keyboard or mouse is sent
to the wrong computer
after switchover.
Solution
Unidirectional data flow is enforced by
hardware "data diodes" so data isolation
doesn't rely on software integrity.
Carefully shielded metal case with dual
shielding in critical areas.
No connections to sensitive analog inputs
(such computer microphone ports) are
provided. Minimum crosstalk separation
of 60dB provided between signals from
one computer and input or I/O signals to
another computer.
Data isolation is assured by hardware
and so is not compromised by any
changes to the microprocessor
software. Microprocessors use one time
programmable memory so flash upgrades
are not possible. Case uses counter-sunk
screws which can be protected by tamper
proof seals.
Keyboard and mouse are powered down
and reset between each switchover to
ensure that all buffers are cleared out.